Chapter 9: The New Harmony:
"Music has stayed at home; what has changed now is the organization of the home and its nature. We are all still Leibnizian, although accords no longer convey our world or our text. We are discovering new ways of folding, akin to new envelopments, but we all remain Leibnizan [sic] because what always matters is folding, unfolding, refolding." [137]
"We could hardly be satisfied in establishing binary relations between the text and music that would inevitably be arbitrary. How to fold the text so that it can be enveloped in music?" [136]
"It is as if Leibniz were delivering us an important message about communication: don't complain about not having enough communication, for these is always plenty of it. Communication seems to be of a constant and preestablished quantity in the world, akin to a sufficient reason." [134]
"Whence the double aspect of the accord, insofar as it is the product of an intelligible calculus in an affective state. To hear the noise of the sea is tantamount to striking a chord, and each monad is intrinsically distinguished by its chords. Monads have inverse numbers, and chords are their 'inner actions.'" [130]
"However simple these examples, they allow us to understand certain traits of the theory of monads, and first of all why we go, not from monads to harmony, but from harmony to monads. Harmony is monadological, but because monads are initially harmonic. The programmatic text states the point clearly: when the infinite Being judges something to be harmonic, it conceives it as a monad, that is, as an intellectual mirror or expression of the world." [129]
"Sometimes ... the object itself is broadened according to a whole network of natural relations. The object itself overflows its frame in order to enter into a cycle or a series, and now the concept is what is found increasingly compressed, interiorized, wrapped in an instance that can ultimately be called 'personal.'" [125]
"Walter Benjamin made a decisive step forward in our understanding of the Baroque when he showed that allegory was not a failed symbol, or an abstract personification, but a power of figuration entirely different from that of the symbol: the latter combines the eternal and the momentary, nearly at the center of the world, but allegory uncovers nature and history according to the order of time." [125]
"In every instance folds of clothing acquire an autonomy and a fullness that are not simply decorative effects. They convey the intensity of a spiritual force exerted on the body, either to turn it upside down or to raise it up over and again, but in every event to turn it inside out and to mold its inner surfaces." [122]
Chapter 8: The Two Floors:
"Thus we see exactly how the two floors are allotted in relation to the world they are conveying. The world is actualized in souls, and is realized in bodies. It is therefore folded over twice, first in the souls that actualize it, and gain folded in the bodies that realize it, and each time according to a regime of laws that corresponds to the nature of souls or to the determination of bodies. And between the two folds, in the in-between of the fold, the Zweifalt, the bending of the two levels, the zone of inseparability that produces the crease or seam." [120]
"The body is analogous to Theseus's ship 'which the Athenians were always repairing.' But, as no monad contains any others, domination would remain a vague notion, having only a nominal definition, if Leibniz had not succeeded in defining it exactly by means of a 'substantial vinculum.' It is a strange linkage, a bracket, a yoke, a knot, a complex relation that comprises variable terms and one constant term." [110]
"If the Baroque has often been associated with capitalism, it is because the Baroque is linked to a crisis of property, a crisis that appears at once with the growth of new machines in the social field and the discovery of new living beings in the organism." [110]
"Leibniz often insists on this point: God does not endow the soul with a body without furnishing the given body with organs." [108]
"It is not the body that realizes, but it is in the body that something is realized, through which the body itself becomes real or substantial." [105]
"What Leibniz calls for, against Newton (as does Ruyer against Gestaltists), is the establishment of a true form that cannot be reduced to an apparent whole or to a phenomenal field, because it must retain the distinction of its details and its own individuality in the hierarchy in which it enters." [103]
Chapter 7: Perception in the Folds
"I possess a clear and distinguished zone of expression because I have primitive singularities, ideal virtual events to which I am destined. From this moment deduction unwinds: I have a body because I have a clear and distinguished zone of expression." [98]
"Macroperception is the product of differential relations that are established among microperceptions; it is thus an unconscious psychic mechanism that engenders the perceived in consciousness. Thus the variable and relative unity of any given phenomenon or another can be explained: all phenomena are collective, like a herd, an army, or a rainbow." [96]
"Every perception is hallucinatory because perception has no object. Conscious perception has no object and does not even refer to a physical mechanism of excitation that could explain it from without: it refers only to the exclusively physical mechanism of differential relations among unconscious perceptions that are comprising it within the monad." [93]
"If life implies a soul, it is because proteins already attest to an activity of perception, discrimination, and distinction -- in short, a 'primary force' that physical impulsions and chemical affinities cannot explain ('derivative forces')." [92]
"[I]n the deepest Baroque regions, and in the deepest Baroque knowledge of the world, this subordination of the true to what is singular and remarkable is being made manifest." [91]
"Inconspicuous perceptions constitute the obscure dust of the world, the dark depths every monad contains. There are differential relations among these presently infinitely small ones that are drawn into clarity; that is to say, that establish a clear perception (the color green) with certain tiny, dark, evanescent perceptions (the colors yellow and blue)." [90]
"All consciousness is a matter of threshold. In each case we would probably have to state why the threshold is marked where it is." [88]
"The task of perception entails pulverizing the world, but also one of spiritualizing its dust. The point is one of knowing how we move from minute perceptions to conscious perceptions, or from molecular perceptions to molar perceptions. Is it through a process of totalization, when for instance I grasp a whole whose parts are imperceptive to me? Thus I apprehend the sound of the sea, or of an assembly of people, but not the murmur of each wave or person who nonetheless is part of each whole." [87]
Chapter 6: What Is an Event?
"With the neo-Baroque, with its unfurling of divergent series in the same world, comes the irruption of incompossibilities on the same stage, where Sextus will rape and not rape Lucretia, where Caesar crosses and does not cross the Rubicon, where Fang kills, is killed, and neither kills nor is killed. In its turn harmony goes through a crisis that leads to a broadened chromatic scale, to an emancipation of dissonance or o unresolved accords, accords not brought back to a tonality. The musical model is the most apt to make clear the rise of harmony in the Baroque, and then the dissipation of tonality in the neo-Baroque: from harmonic closure to an opening onto a polytonality or, as Boulez will say, a 'polyphony of polyphonies.'" [82]
"Figures, things, and qualities are schema of permanence that are reflected or actualized in monads, but that are realized in flux; even composite substances, as we shall observe, need an ultimate quality that marks every one of them." [80]
"But the monad has several forms of active expression that make up its ways or manners, according to the ways in which its perceptions are sensitive, active or conceptual. In this sense appetite designates the movement from one perception to another as being constitutive of a becoming. Finally, this becoming is not completed without the sum of perceptions tending to be integrated in a great pleasure, a Satisfaction with which the monad fills itself when it expresses the world, a musical Joy of contracting its vibrations, of calculating them without knowing their harmonics or of drawing force enough to go further and further ahead in order to produce something new. For with Leibniz the question surges forth in philosophy that will continue to haunt Whitehead and Bergson: not how to attain eternity, but in what conditions does the objective world allow for a subjective production of novelty, that is, of creation?" [79]
"The event is a vibration with an infinity of harmonics or submultiples, such as an audible wave, a luminous wave, or even an increasingly smaller part of space over the course of an increasingly shorter duration." [77]
"What are the conditions that make an event possible? Events are produced in a chaos, in a chaotic multiplicity, but only under the condition that a sort of screen intervenes." [76]
"With Whitehead's name there comes for the third time an echo of the question, What is an event? He takes up the radical critique of the attributive scheme, the great play of principles, the multiplications of categories, the conciliation of the universal and the individual example, and the transformation of the concept into a subject: an entire hubris. He stands provisionally as the last great Anglo-American philosopher before Wittgenstein's disciples spread their misty confusion, sufficiency and terror." [76]
Chapter 5: Incompossibility, Individuality, Liberty
"Leibniz's optimism is based on the infinity of the damned as the foundation of the best of all worlds: they liberate an infinite quantity of possible progress." [74]
"In all cases it is true that the world only exists folded in the monads that express it, and is only unfolded virtually as the common horizon of all monads, or as the outer law of the series they include. But in a more restricted sense, in an intrinsic way, it can be said that when a monad is summoned to 'live' -- yet more when it is called to reason -- it unfolds in itself this region of the world that corresponds to its enclosed enlightened zone: it is called upon to 'develop all its perceptions,' and therein its task resides. Then, at the same time, an infinity of monads has not yet been called and remains folded; another infinity of them has fallen or falls in the night, folded onto themselves; while another infinity has been damned, hardened in a single fold that it will not unfurl." [74]
"A reader is immediately struck by the similarity of Leibniz's themes to Bergson's thesis: the same critique of illusion on motives, the same conception of the inflections of the soul, the same requirement of inherence or inclusion as a condition of the free act, the same description of the free act as what expresses the self ..." [72]
"In at least two writings -- one short and the other extensive -- Leibniz inaugurates the first great phenomenology of motives." [69]
"In human eyes it does not suffice that Adam may not sin in another world, if he is certainly sinning in this world. Leibniz leaves the impression that he is condemning us even more strongly than Spinoza, for whom there at least existed a process of possible liberation, whereas for Leibniz everything is sealed off from the beginning and remains in a condition of closure." [69]
"Monads have to be conceived as dancing." [68]
"The true character of the Leibnizian game -- and what opposes it to the roll of the dice -- is first of all a proliferation of principles: play is executed through excess and not a lack of principles; the game is that of principles themselves, of inventing principles. It is thus a game of reflection, of chess or checkers, where skill (not chance) replaces old gifts of wisdom or prudence ... The Baroque is just that, at a time just before the world loses its principles. It is the splendid moment when Some Thing is kept rather than nothing, and where response to the world's misery is made through an excess of principles, a hubris of principles, and a hubris inherent to principles." [67-8]
"It is a vast play of architecture or of paved grounds: How can a space be filled with the fewest possible voids, and with the greatest possible number of figures? ... The play interiorizes not only the players who serve as pieces, but the board on which the game is played, and the material of that board." [66-7]
"The play of the world has several aspects: it emits singularities; it puts forward infinite series that go from one singularity to another; it invents rules of convergence and divergence according to which these series of possibles are organized in infinite totalities, each totality being compossible, but two totalities together being incompossible with each other; it allots the singularities of each world in one way or another in the nucleus of monads or individuals that express this world." [66]
"Individuation does not go from a genre to smaller and smaller species, in accord with a law of differentiation, but goes from singularity to singularity, under the law of convergence or of prolongation that ties the individual to one world or another." [64]
Chapter 4: Sufficient Reason
"No philosophy has ever pushed to such an extreme the affirmation of a one and same world, and of an infinite difference or variety in this world." [58]
"Leibniz is haunted by depth of the soul, the dark depth, the 'fuscum subnigrum.' Substances or souls 'draw everything from their own depths.' That is the second aspect of Mannerism, without which the first would remain empty. The first is the spontaneity of manners that is opposed to the essentiality of the attribute. The second is the omnipresences of the dark depths which is opposed to the clarity of form, and without which manners would have no place to surge forth from. The entire formula of the Mannerism of substances is: 'All is born to them out of their own depths, through a perfect spontaneity.'" [57]
"Essentialism makes a classic of Descartes, while Leibniz's thought appears to be a profound Mannerism. Classicism needs a solid and constant attribute for substance, but Mannerist is fluid, and the spontaneity of manners replaces the essentiality of the attribute." [56]
"The Stoics and Leibniz invent a mannerist that is opposed to the essentialism first of Aristotle and then of Descartes. Mannerist as a composite of the Baroque is inherited from a Stoic mannerism that is now extended to the cosmos. A third great logic of the event will come with Whitehead." [53]
"Leibnizian inclusion is based upon a scheme of subject-verb-object that since antiquity resists the scheme of attribution. Here we have a Baroque grammar in which the predicate is above all a relation and an event, and not an attribute. When Leibniz uses the attributive model, he does so from the point of view of a classical logic of genres and species, which follows only nominal requirements. He does not use it in order to ground inclusion. Predication is not an attribution. The predicate is the 'execution of travel,' an act, a movement, a change, and not the state of travel. The predicate is the proposition itself. And I can no more reduce 'I travel' to 'I am a traveling being' than I can reduce 'I think' to 'I am a thinking being.' Thought is not a constant attribute, but a predicate passing endlessly from one through to another." [53]
"Relations themselves are types of events, and problems in mathematics. In antiquity predicates were defined by events that happen to figures. Events in their turn are types of relations; they are relations to existence and to time." [52]
"Time and again we discover an incertitude that is objective: On the one hand, does the fold pass between essences and existents or, on the other, between essences of God and what follows? Or between the essences of things and existents?" [52]
"Inclusion is virtual, Leibniz specifies, because it has to be extracted, and because the predicate is included in the subject only 'under a certain power.'" [52]
"Whether intuitive, theoramtic, or problematic, essences are always understood in an infinity. Identicals themselves are intuitive essences, in this way taken as infinite forms. In contrast, it is true that in the area of essences we can always stop, and make use of a definition as if it were a final Identical, or of a Requisite as if it were a definition, of a Limit, as if it had been reached. In the area of existences, to the contrary, we cannot stop, because series are liable to be extended and must be so because inclusion cannot be localized." [51]
"We therefore have three types of inclusion: auto-inclusions, reciprocal inclusions, and unilateral inclusions that can be localized at their limits. Their corresponding term, the absolute-simples, Identicals or infinite forms lacking any relation to each other; the relative-simples, the Definables, that enter into infinite series of wholes and parts, while their definers enter into relations; the limitative-simples, Requisites or converging series that tend toward limits, with their elations among limits. It is the alphabet, the Combinatory, and the Characteristic ... Absolute Forms, Identicals, are simple and separated folds; Definables are already composite folds; Requisites with their limits resemble even more complex hems (and take up textures). monads, that necessarily imply a point of view or a grounding, cannot fail to bear resemblance to draped forms." [48-9]
"Parts or wholes do not exist any more; they are replaced by degrees for each character. The inner characters of a sound include an actual intensity, a pitch, a duration, a timbre; a color has a tint, a saturation, a value; gold, in an example that Leibniz often uses, has a color, a weight, a malleability, a resistance to melting and to dissolution in nitric acid. The real matter is not only extension; it possesses an 'impenetrability, inertia, impetuosity and attachment.' It is what is called the texture of a body, it is specifically the sum of its inner qualities, the latitude of their variation and the relationship of their limits: hence the texture of gold." [47]
"Definables are derived notions: they can be simple if they are first in their order, but they always presuppose at least two primitives that define them in a relation, under a 'vinculum,' or through the intermediary of a particle that itself can be simple or complex (for example, A in B). That is the Combinatory that goes thus from Identicals to Definables, from primary to derived beings, through a distinction of levels: level I includes the primary or the indefinable Identicals; level II is composed of the simple derived beings, defined by two primary beings in a simple relation; level III is composed of composite derived beings defined by three primaries, or by a simple primary and a simple derived being in a relation that is itself composite ..." [45]
"There we find in fact the only thesis that ties Spinoza to Leibniz, their common manner of requiring in the ontological proof of the existence of God a detour that Descartes had confidence enough to cut short: before concluding that an infinitely perfect being necessarily exists, it had to be shown that it is possible (a real definition), and that it does not imply contradiction." [44]
"Inflection is the event that happens to the line or to the point. Inclusion is the predication that places inflection in the concept of the line or the point, that is, in this other point that will be called metaphysical. We go from inflection to inclusion just as we move from the event of the thing to the predicate of the notion, or from 'seeing' to 'reading.'" [41]
Chapter 3: What is Baroque?
"[T]he search for a model of the fold goes directly through the choice of a material. Would it be the paper fold, as the Orient implies, or the fold of fabric, that seems to dominate the Occident?" [37]
"As a general rule the way a material is folded is what constitutes its texture. It is defined less by its heterogenous and really distinct parts than by the style by which they become inseparable by virtue of particular folds." [36]
"It may be that the Baroque will have to confront the Orient profoundly. This happened to be Leibniz's adventure with his binary arithmetic: in one and zero Leibniz acknowledges the full and the void in a Chines fashion; but the Baroque Leibniz does not believe in the void. For him it always seems to be filled with a folded matter, because binary arithmetic superimposes folds that both the decimal system -- and Nature itself -- conceal in apparent voids. For Leibniz, and in the Baroque, folds are always full." [36]
"Matter that reveals its texture becomes raw material, just as form that reveals its folds becomes force." [35]
"[T]he Baroque invents the infinite work or process. The problem is not how to finish a fold, but how to continue it, to have it go through the ceiling, how to bring it to infinity." [34]
"To be sure, it might be argued that the concept of the fold also remains too broad: If we restrict ourselves to the plastic arts, what period and what style would fail to recognize the fold as a trait of painting or of sculpture? It is not only in clothing, but includes the body, rocks, waters, earth, and line." [34]
"The best inventors of the Baroque, the commentators have had their doubts about the consistency of the notion, and have been bewildered by the arbitrary extension that, despite themselves, the notion risked taking. The Baroque was seen as being restricted to one genre (architecture), or to an increasingly restrictive determination of periods and places, or yet again to a a radical disavowal: the Baroque never existed. It is nonetheless strange to deny the existence of the Baroque in the way we speak of unicorns or herds of pink elephants. For in this case the concept is given, while in the case of the Baroque the question entails knowing if a concept can be invented that is capable (or not) of attributing existence to it. Irregular pearls exist, but the Baroque has no reason for existing without a concept that forms this very reason ... For our purposes the criterion or operative concept of the Baroque is the Fold, everything that it includes, and in all its extensiveness." [33]
"It is well known that the total book is as much Leibniz's dream as it is Mallarmé's, even though they never stop working in fragments. Our error is in believing that they did not succeed in their wishes: they made this unique Book perfectly, the book of monads, in letters and little circumstantial pieces that could sustain as many dispersions as combinations." [31]
"When Heidegger calls upon the Zweifalt to be the differentiator of difference, he means above all that differentiation does not refer to a pregiven undifferentiated, but to a Difference that endlessly unfolds and folds over from each of its two sides, and that unfolds the one only while refolding the other, in a coextensive unveiling and veiling of Being, of presence and of withdrawal of being." [30]
"That one is metaphysical, dealing with souls, or that the other is physical, entailing bodies, does not impede the two vectors from comprising a similar world, a similar house." [29]
"Yet the inside remains perfectly integral from the point of view, or in the mirror, that oversees its decoration, no matter how complicated it might be." [29]
"The monad is the autonomy of the inside, an inside without an outside. It has as its correlative the independence of the façade, an outside without an inside. Now the façade can have doors and windows -- it is riddled with holes -- although there may be no void, a hole being only the site of a more rarefied matter." [28]
"For ages there have been places where what is seen is inside: a cell, a sacristy, a crypt, a church, a theater, a study, or a print room. The Baroque invests in all of these places in order to extract from them power and glory." [28]
"More exactly, in Rauschenberg's work we could say that the surface stops being a window on the world and now becomes an opaque grid of information on which the ciphered line is written. The painting-window is replaced by tabulation, the grid on which lines, numbers, and changing characters are inscribed (the objectile)." [27]
Chapter 2: The Folds in the Soul:
"Because the world is in the monad, each monad includes every series of the states of the world; but, because the monad is for the world, no one clearly contains the "reason" of the series of which they are all a result, and which remains outside of them, just like the principle of their accord." [26]
As an individual unit each monad includes the whole series; hence it conveys the entire world, but does not express it without expressing more clearly a small region of the world, a "subdivision," a borough of the city, a finite sequence. Two souls do not have the same order, but neither do they have the same sequence or the same clear or enlightened region." [25]
"We can consider the series of the twelve sounds: the series can undergo in turn many variations that are both rhythmic and melodic, but that also follow the contrary, or retrograde, movement. With greater reason an infinite series, even if the variable is unique, cannot be separated from an infinity of variations that make it up: we necessarily take it in accord with all possible, orders, and we favor this or that partial sequence at this or that time. That is why only one form -- or one street -- recovers its rights, but only in respect to the entire series." [25]
"What can be apprehended from one point of view is therefore neither a determined street nor a relation that might be determined with other streets, which are constants, but the variety of all possible connections between the course of a given street and that of another. The city seems to be a labyrinth that can be ordered. The world is an infinite series of curvatures or inflections, and the entire world is enclosed in the soul from one point of view." [24]
"Everyone knows the name that Leibniz ascribes to the soul or to the subject as a metaphysical point: the monad. He borrows this name from the Neoplatonists who used it to designate a state of One, a unity that envelops a multiplicity, this multiplicity developing the One in the manner of a "series." The One specifically has a power of envelopment and development, while the multiple is inseparable from the folds that i makes when it is enveloped, and of unfoldings when it is developed." [23]
"A soul always includes what it apprehends from its point of view, in other words, inflection. Inflection is an ideal condition or a virtuality that currently exists only in the soul that envelops it. Thus the soul is what has folds and is full of folds." [22]
"Why would something be folded, if it were not to be enveloped, wrapped, or put into something else? If appears that here the envelope acquires its ultimate or perhaps final meaning: it is not longer an envelope of coherence or cohesion, like an egg, in the "reciprocal envelopment" of organic parts. Nor even a mathematical envelope of adherence or adhesion, where a fold still envelops other folds, as in the enveloping envelope that touches an infinity of curves in an infinity of points. It is an envelope of inherence or of unilateral "inhesion": inclusion or inherence is the final cause of the fold, such that we move indiscernibly from the latter to the former. Between the two, a gap is opened which makes the envelope the reason for the fold: what is folded is the included, the inherent. It can be stated that what is folded is only virtual and currently exists only in an envelope, in something that envelops it." [22]
"Leibniz can define extension (extensio) as "continuous repetition" of the situs or position -- that is, of point of view: not that extension is therefore the attribute of point of view, but that the attribute of space (spatium), an order of distances between points of view, is what makes this repetition possible." [20]
"Such is the basis of perspectivism, which does not mean a dependence in respect to a pregiven or defined subject; to the contrary, a subject will be what comes to the point of view, or rather what remains in the point of view ... A needed relation exists between variation and point of view: not simply because of the variety of points of view ... but in the first place because every point of view is a point of view on variation ... For Leibniz, for Nietzsche, for William and Henry James, and for Whitehead as well, perspectivism amounts to a relativism, but not the relativism we take for granted. It is not a variation of truth according to the subject, but the condition in which the truth of a variation appears to the subject. This is the very idea of Baroque perspective." [20]
"The new status of the object no longer refers its condition to a spatial mold -- in other words, to a relation of form-matter -- but to a temporary modulation that implies as much the beginnings of a continuous variation of matter as a continuous development of form ... His [Leibniz's] is not only a temporal but also a qualitative conception of the object, to the extent that sounds and colors are flexible and taken in modulation. The object here is manneristic, not essentializing: it becomes an event." [19]
"The definition of Baroque mathematics is born with Leibniz. The object of the discipline is a "new affection" of variable sizes, which is variation itself." [17]
"Everything changes when fluctuation is made to intervene in the place of internal homothesis. It is no longer possible to determine an angular point between two others, no matter how close one is to the other; but there remains the latitude to always add a detour by making each interval the site of a new folding. That is how we go from fold to fold and not from point to point, and how every contour is blurred to give definition to the formal powers of the raw material, which rise to the surface and are put forward as so many detours and supplementary folds." [17]
"Thus inflection is the pure Event of the line or of the point, the Virtual, ideality par excellence." [15]
"Inflection is the ideal genetic element of the variable curve or fold. Inflection is the authentic atom, the elastic point. That is what Klee extracts as the genetic element of the active, spontaneous line." [14]
"Music has stayed at home; what has changed now is the organization of the home and its nature. We are all still Leibnizian, although accords no longer convey our world or our text. We are discovering new ways of folding, akin to new envelopments, but we all remain Leibnizan [sic] because what always matters is folding, unfolding, refolding." [137]
"We could hardly be satisfied in establishing binary relations between the text and music that would inevitably be arbitrary. How to fold the text so that it can be enveloped in music?" [136]
"It is as if Leibniz were delivering us an important message about communication: don't complain about not having enough communication, for these is always plenty of it. Communication seems to be of a constant and preestablished quantity in the world, akin to a sufficient reason." [134]
"Whence the double aspect of the accord, insofar as it is the product of an intelligible calculus in an affective state. To hear the noise of the sea is tantamount to striking a chord, and each monad is intrinsically distinguished by its chords. Monads have inverse numbers, and chords are their 'inner actions.'" [130]
"However simple these examples, they allow us to understand certain traits of the theory of monads, and first of all why we go, not from monads to harmony, but from harmony to monads. Harmony is monadological, but because monads are initially harmonic. The programmatic text states the point clearly: when the infinite Being judges something to be harmonic, it conceives it as a monad, that is, as an intellectual mirror or expression of the world." [129]
"Sometimes ... the object itself is broadened according to a whole network of natural relations. The object itself overflows its frame in order to enter into a cycle or a series, and now the concept is what is found increasingly compressed, interiorized, wrapped in an instance that can ultimately be called 'personal.'" [125]
"Walter Benjamin made a decisive step forward in our understanding of the Baroque when he showed that allegory was not a failed symbol, or an abstract personification, but a power of figuration entirely different from that of the symbol: the latter combines the eternal and the momentary, nearly at the center of the world, but allegory uncovers nature and history according to the order of time." [125]
"In every instance folds of clothing acquire an autonomy and a fullness that are not simply decorative effects. They convey the intensity of a spiritual force exerted on the body, either to turn it upside down or to raise it up over and again, but in every event to turn it inside out and to mold its inner surfaces." [122]
Chapter 8: The Two Floors:
"Thus we see exactly how the two floors are allotted in relation to the world they are conveying. The world is actualized in souls, and is realized in bodies. It is therefore folded over twice, first in the souls that actualize it, and gain folded in the bodies that realize it, and each time according to a regime of laws that corresponds to the nature of souls or to the determination of bodies. And between the two folds, in the in-between of the fold, the Zweifalt, the bending of the two levels, the zone of inseparability that produces the crease or seam." [120]
"The body is analogous to Theseus's ship 'which the Athenians were always repairing.' But, as no monad contains any others, domination would remain a vague notion, having only a nominal definition, if Leibniz had not succeeded in defining it exactly by means of a 'substantial vinculum.' It is a strange linkage, a bracket, a yoke, a knot, a complex relation that comprises variable terms and one constant term." [110]
"If the Baroque has often been associated with capitalism, it is because the Baroque is linked to a crisis of property, a crisis that appears at once with the growth of new machines in the social field and the discovery of new living beings in the organism." [110]
"Leibniz often insists on this point: God does not endow the soul with a body without furnishing the given body with organs." [108]
"It is not the body that realizes, but it is in the body that something is realized, through which the body itself becomes real or substantial." [105]
"What Leibniz calls for, against Newton (as does Ruyer against Gestaltists), is the establishment of a true form that cannot be reduced to an apparent whole or to a phenomenal field, because it must retain the distinction of its details and its own individuality in the hierarchy in which it enters." [103]
Chapter 7: Perception in the Folds
"I possess a clear and distinguished zone of expression because I have primitive singularities, ideal virtual events to which I am destined. From this moment deduction unwinds: I have a body because I have a clear and distinguished zone of expression." [98]
"Macroperception is the product of differential relations that are established among microperceptions; it is thus an unconscious psychic mechanism that engenders the perceived in consciousness. Thus the variable and relative unity of any given phenomenon or another can be explained: all phenomena are collective, like a herd, an army, or a rainbow." [96]
"Every perception is hallucinatory because perception has no object. Conscious perception has no object and does not even refer to a physical mechanism of excitation that could explain it from without: it refers only to the exclusively physical mechanism of differential relations among unconscious perceptions that are comprising it within the monad." [93]
"If life implies a soul, it is because proteins already attest to an activity of perception, discrimination, and distinction -- in short, a 'primary force' that physical impulsions and chemical affinities cannot explain ('derivative forces')." [92]
"[I]n the deepest Baroque regions, and in the deepest Baroque knowledge of the world, this subordination of the true to what is singular and remarkable is being made manifest." [91]
"Inconspicuous perceptions constitute the obscure dust of the world, the dark depths every monad contains. There are differential relations among these presently infinitely small ones that are drawn into clarity; that is to say, that establish a clear perception (the color green) with certain tiny, dark, evanescent perceptions (the colors yellow and blue)." [90]
"All consciousness is a matter of threshold. In each case we would probably have to state why the threshold is marked where it is." [88]
"The task of perception entails pulverizing the world, but also one of spiritualizing its dust. The point is one of knowing how we move from minute perceptions to conscious perceptions, or from molecular perceptions to molar perceptions. Is it through a process of totalization, when for instance I grasp a whole whose parts are imperceptive to me? Thus I apprehend the sound of the sea, or of an assembly of people, but not the murmur of each wave or person who nonetheless is part of each whole." [87]
Chapter 6: What Is an Event?
"With the neo-Baroque, with its unfurling of divergent series in the same world, comes the irruption of incompossibilities on the same stage, where Sextus will rape and not rape Lucretia, where Caesar crosses and does not cross the Rubicon, where Fang kills, is killed, and neither kills nor is killed. In its turn harmony goes through a crisis that leads to a broadened chromatic scale, to an emancipation of dissonance or o unresolved accords, accords not brought back to a tonality. The musical model is the most apt to make clear the rise of harmony in the Baroque, and then the dissipation of tonality in the neo-Baroque: from harmonic closure to an opening onto a polytonality or, as Boulez will say, a 'polyphony of polyphonies.'" [82]
"Figures, things, and qualities are schema of permanence that are reflected or actualized in monads, but that are realized in flux; even composite substances, as we shall observe, need an ultimate quality that marks every one of them." [80]
"But the monad has several forms of active expression that make up its ways or manners, according to the ways in which its perceptions are sensitive, active or conceptual. In this sense appetite designates the movement from one perception to another as being constitutive of a becoming. Finally, this becoming is not completed without the sum of perceptions tending to be integrated in a great pleasure, a Satisfaction with which the monad fills itself when it expresses the world, a musical Joy of contracting its vibrations, of calculating them without knowing their harmonics or of drawing force enough to go further and further ahead in order to produce something new. For with Leibniz the question surges forth in philosophy that will continue to haunt Whitehead and Bergson: not how to attain eternity, but in what conditions does the objective world allow for a subjective production of novelty, that is, of creation?" [79]
"The event is a vibration with an infinity of harmonics or submultiples, such as an audible wave, a luminous wave, or even an increasingly smaller part of space over the course of an increasingly shorter duration." [77]
"What are the conditions that make an event possible? Events are produced in a chaos, in a chaotic multiplicity, but only under the condition that a sort of screen intervenes." [76]
"With Whitehead's name there comes for the third time an echo of the question, What is an event? He takes up the radical critique of the attributive scheme, the great play of principles, the multiplications of categories, the conciliation of the universal and the individual example, and the transformation of the concept into a subject: an entire hubris. He stands provisionally as the last great Anglo-American philosopher before Wittgenstein's disciples spread their misty confusion, sufficiency and terror." [76]
Chapter 5: Incompossibility, Individuality, Liberty
"Leibniz's optimism is based on the infinity of the damned as the foundation of the best of all worlds: they liberate an infinite quantity of possible progress." [74]
"In all cases it is true that the world only exists folded in the monads that express it, and is only unfolded virtually as the common horizon of all monads, or as the outer law of the series they include. But in a more restricted sense, in an intrinsic way, it can be said that when a monad is summoned to 'live' -- yet more when it is called to reason -- it unfolds in itself this region of the world that corresponds to its enclosed enlightened zone: it is called upon to 'develop all its perceptions,' and therein its task resides. Then, at the same time, an infinity of monads has not yet been called and remains folded; another infinity of them has fallen or falls in the night, folded onto themselves; while another infinity has been damned, hardened in a single fold that it will not unfurl." [74]
"A reader is immediately struck by the similarity of Leibniz's themes to Bergson's thesis: the same critique of illusion on motives, the same conception of the inflections of the soul, the same requirement of inherence or inclusion as a condition of the free act, the same description of the free act as what expresses the self ..." [72]
"In at least two writings -- one short and the other extensive -- Leibniz inaugurates the first great phenomenology of motives." [69]
"In human eyes it does not suffice that Adam may not sin in another world, if he is certainly sinning in this world. Leibniz leaves the impression that he is condemning us even more strongly than Spinoza, for whom there at least existed a process of possible liberation, whereas for Leibniz everything is sealed off from the beginning and remains in a condition of closure." [69]
"Monads have to be conceived as dancing." [68]
"The true character of the Leibnizian game -- and what opposes it to the roll of the dice -- is first of all a proliferation of principles: play is executed through excess and not a lack of principles; the game is that of principles themselves, of inventing principles. It is thus a game of reflection, of chess or checkers, where skill (not chance) replaces old gifts of wisdom or prudence ... The Baroque is just that, at a time just before the world loses its principles. It is the splendid moment when Some Thing is kept rather than nothing, and where response to the world's misery is made through an excess of principles, a hubris of principles, and a hubris inherent to principles." [67-8]
"It is a vast play of architecture or of paved grounds: How can a space be filled with the fewest possible voids, and with the greatest possible number of figures? ... The play interiorizes not only the players who serve as pieces, but the board on which the game is played, and the material of that board." [66-7]
"The play of the world has several aspects: it emits singularities; it puts forward infinite series that go from one singularity to another; it invents rules of convergence and divergence according to which these series of possibles are organized in infinite totalities, each totality being compossible, but two totalities together being incompossible with each other; it allots the singularities of each world in one way or another in the nucleus of monads or individuals that express this world." [66]
"Individuation does not go from a genre to smaller and smaller species, in accord with a law of differentiation, but goes from singularity to singularity, under the law of convergence or of prolongation that ties the individual to one world or another." [64]
Chapter 4: Sufficient Reason
"No philosophy has ever pushed to such an extreme the affirmation of a one and same world, and of an infinite difference or variety in this world." [58]
"Leibniz is haunted by depth of the soul, the dark depth, the 'fuscum subnigrum.' Substances or souls 'draw everything from their own depths.' That is the second aspect of Mannerism, without which the first would remain empty. The first is the spontaneity of manners that is opposed to the essentiality of the attribute. The second is the omnipresences of the dark depths which is opposed to the clarity of form, and without which manners would have no place to surge forth from. The entire formula of the Mannerism of substances is: 'All is born to them out of their own depths, through a perfect spontaneity.'" [57]
"Essentialism makes a classic of Descartes, while Leibniz's thought appears to be a profound Mannerism. Classicism needs a solid and constant attribute for substance, but Mannerist is fluid, and the spontaneity of manners replaces the essentiality of the attribute." [56]
"The Stoics and Leibniz invent a mannerist that is opposed to the essentialism first of Aristotle and then of Descartes. Mannerist as a composite of the Baroque is inherited from a Stoic mannerism that is now extended to the cosmos. A third great logic of the event will come with Whitehead." [53]
"Leibnizian inclusion is based upon a scheme of subject-verb-object that since antiquity resists the scheme of attribution. Here we have a Baroque grammar in which the predicate is above all a relation and an event, and not an attribute. When Leibniz uses the attributive model, he does so from the point of view of a classical logic of genres and species, which follows only nominal requirements. He does not use it in order to ground inclusion. Predication is not an attribution. The predicate is the 'execution of travel,' an act, a movement, a change, and not the state of travel. The predicate is the proposition itself. And I can no more reduce 'I travel' to 'I am a traveling being' than I can reduce 'I think' to 'I am a thinking being.' Thought is not a constant attribute, but a predicate passing endlessly from one through to another." [53]
"Relations themselves are types of events, and problems in mathematics. In antiquity predicates were defined by events that happen to figures. Events in their turn are types of relations; they are relations to existence and to time." [52]
"Time and again we discover an incertitude that is objective: On the one hand, does the fold pass between essences and existents or, on the other, between essences of God and what follows? Or between the essences of things and existents?" [52]
"Inclusion is virtual, Leibniz specifies, because it has to be extracted, and because the predicate is included in the subject only 'under a certain power.'" [52]
"Whether intuitive, theoramtic, or problematic, essences are always understood in an infinity. Identicals themselves are intuitive essences, in this way taken as infinite forms. In contrast, it is true that in the area of essences we can always stop, and make use of a definition as if it were a final Identical, or of a Requisite as if it were a definition, of a Limit, as if it had been reached. In the area of existences, to the contrary, we cannot stop, because series are liable to be extended and must be so because inclusion cannot be localized." [51]
"We therefore have three types of inclusion: auto-inclusions, reciprocal inclusions, and unilateral inclusions that can be localized at their limits. Their corresponding term, the absolute-simples, Identicals or infinite forms lacking any relation to each other; the relative-simples, the Definables, that enter into infinite series of wholes and parts, while their definers enter into relations; the limitative-simples, Requisites or converging series that tend toward limits, with their elations among limits. It is the alphabet, the Combinatory, and the Characteristic ... Absolute Forms, Identicals, are simple and separated folds; Definables are already composite folds; Requisites with their limits resemble even more complex hems (and take up textures). monads, that necessarily imply a point of view or a grounding, cannot fail to bear resemblance to draped forms." [48-9]
"Parts or wholes do not exist any more; they are replaced by degrees for each character. The inner characters of a sound include an actual intensity, a pitch, a duration, a timbre; a color has a tint, a saturation, a value; gold, in an example that Leibniz often uses, has a color, a weight, a malleability, a resistance to melting and to dissolution in nitric acid. The real matter is not only extension; it possesses an 'impenetrability, inertia, impetuosity and attachment.' It is what is called the texture of a body, it is specifically the sum of its inner qualities, the latitude of their variation and the relationship of their limits: hence the texture of gold." [47]
"Definables are derived notions: they can be simple if they are first in their order, but they always presuppose at least two primitives that define them in a relation, under a 'vinculum,' or through the intermediary of a particle that itself can be simple or complex (for example, A in B). That is the Combinatory that goes thus from Identicals to Definables, from primary to derived beings, through a distinction of levels: level I includes the primary or the indefinable Identicals; level II is composed of the simple derived beings, defined by two primary beings in a simple relation; level III is composed of composite derived beings defined by three primaries, or by a simple primary and a simple derived being in a relation that is itself composite ..." [45]
"There we find in fact the only thesis that ties Spinoza to Leibniz, their common manner of requiring in the ontological proof of the existence of God a detour that Descartes had confidence enough to cut short: before concluding that an infinitely perfect being necessarily exists, it had to be shown that it is possible (a real definition), and that it does not imply contradiction." [44]
"Inflection is the event that happens to the line or to the point. Inclusion is the predication that places inflection in the concept of the line or the point, that is, in this other point that will be called metaphysical. We go from inflection to inclusion just as we move from the event of the thing to the predicate of the notion, or from 'seeing' to 'reading.'" [41]
Chapter 3: What is Baroque?
"[T]he search for a model of the fold goes directly through the choice of a material. Would it be the paper fold, as the Orient implies, or the fold of fabric, that seems to dominate the Occident?" [37]
"As a general rule the way a material is folded is what constitutes its texture. It is defined less by its heterogenous and really distinct parts than by the style by which they become inseparable by virtue of particular folds." [36]
"It may be that the Baroque will have to confront the Orient profoundly. This happened to be Leibniz's adventure with his binary arithmetic: in one and zero Leibniz acknowledges the full and the void in a Chines fashion; but the Baroque Leibniz does not believe in the void. For him it always seems to be filled with a folded matter, because binary arithmetic superimposes folds that both the decimal system -- and Nature itself -- conceal in apparent voids. For Leibniz, and in the Baroque, folds are always full." [36]
"Matter that reveals its texture becomes raw material, just as form that reveals its folds becomes force." [35]
"[T]he Baroque invents the infinite work or process. The problem is not how to finish a fold, but how to continue it, to have it go through the ceiling, how to bring it to infinity." [34]
"To be sure, it might be argued that the concept of the fold also remains too broad: If we restrict ourselves to the plastic arts, what period and what style would fail to recognize the fold as a trait of painting or of sculpture? It is not only in clothing, but includes the body, rocks, waters, earth, and line." [34]
"The best inventors of the Baroque, the commentators have had their doubts about the consistency of the notion, and have been bewildered by the arbitrary extension that, despite themselves, the notion risked taking. The Baroque was seen as being restricted to one genre (architecture), or to an increasingly restrictive determination of periods and places, or yet again to a a radical disavowal: the Baroque never existed. It is nonetheless strange to deny the existence of the Baroque in the way we speak of unicorns or herds of pink elephants. For in this case the concept is given, while in the case of the Baroque the question entails knowing if a concept can be invented that is capable (or not) of attributing existence to it. Irregular pearls exist, but the Baroque has no reason for existing without a concept that forms this very reason ... For our purposes the criterion or operative concept of the Baroque is the Fold, everything that it includes, and in all its extensiveness." [33]
"It is well known that the total book is as much Leibniz's dream as it is Mallarmé's, even though they never stop working in fragments. Our error is in believing that they did not succeed in their wishes: they made this unique Book perfectly, the book of monads, in letters and little circumstantial pieces that could sustain as many dispersions as combinations." [31]
"When Heidegger calls upon the Zweifalt to be the differentiator of difference, he means above all that differentiation does not refer to a pregiven undifferentiated, but to a Difference that endlessly unfolds and folds over from each of its two sides, and that unfolds the one only while refolding the other, in a coextensive unveiling and veiling of Being, of presence and of withdrawal of being." [30]
"That one is metaphysical, dealing with souls, or that the other is physical, entailing bodies, does not impede the two vectors from comprising a similar world, a similar house." [29]
"Yet the inside remains perfectly integral from the point of view, or in the mirror, that oversees its decoration, no matter how complicated it might be." [29]
"The monad is the autonomy of the inside, an inside without an outside. It has as its correlative the independence of the façade, an outside without an inside. Now the façade can have doors and windows -- it is riddled with holes -- although there may be no void, a hole being only the site of a more rarefied matter." [28]
"For ages there have been places where what is seen is inside: a cell, a sacristy, a crypt, a church, a theater, a study, or a print room. The Baroque invests in all of these places in order to extract from them power and glory." [28]
"More exactly, in Rauschenberg's work we could say that the surface stops being a window on the world and now becomes an opaque grid of information on which the ciphered line is written. The painting-window is replaced by tabulation, the grid on which lines, numbers, and changing characters are inscribed (the objectile)." [27]
Chapter 2: The Folds in the Soul:
"Because the world is in the monad, each monad includes every series of the states of the world; but, because the monad is for the world, no one clearly contains the "reason" of the series of which they are all a result, and which remains outside of them, just like the principle of their accord." [26]
As an individual unit each monad includes the whole series; hence it conveys the entire world, but does not express it without expressing more clearly a small region of the world, a "subdivision," a borough of the city, a finite sequence. Two souls do not have the same order, but neither do they have the same sequence or the same clear or enlightened region." [25]
"We can consider the series of the twelve sounds: the series can undergo in turn many variations that are both rhythmic and melodic, but that also follow the contrary, or retrograde, movement. With greater reason an infinite series, even if the variable is unique, cannot be separated from an infinity of variations that make it up: we necessarily take it in accord with all possible, orders, and we favor this or that partial sequence at this or that time. That is why only one form -- or one street -- recovers its rights, but only in respect to the entire series." [25]
"What can be apprehended from one point of view is therefore neither a determined street nor a relation that might be determined with other streets, which are constants, but the variety of all possible connections between the course of a given street and that of another. The city seems to be a labyrinth that can be ordered. The world is an infinite series of curvatures or inflections, and the entire world is enclosed in the soul from one point of view." [24]
"Everyone knows the name that Leibniz ascribes to the soul or to the subject as a metaphysical point: the monad. He borrows this name from the Neoplatonists who used it to designate a state of One, a unity that envelops a multiplicity, this multiplicity developing the One in the manner of a "series." The One specifically has a power of envelopment and development, while the multiple is inseparable from the folds that i makes when it is enveloped, and of unfoldings when it is developed." [23]
"A soul always includes what it apprehends from its point of view, in other words, inflection. Inflection is an ideal condition or a virtuality that currently exists only in the soul that envelops it. Thus the soul is what has folds and is full of folds." [22]
"Why would something be folded, if it were not to be enveloped, wrapped, or put into something else? If appears that here the envelope acquires its ultimate or perhaps final meaning: it is not longer an envelope of coherence or cohesion, like an egg, in the "reciprocal envelopment" of organic parts. Nor even a mathematical envelope of adherence or adhesion, where a fold still envelops other folds, as in the enveloping envelope that touches an infinity of curves in an infinity of points. It is an envelope of inherence or of unilateral "inhesion": inclusion or inherence is the final cause of the fold, such that we move indiscernibly from the latter to the former. Between the two, a gap is opened which makes the envelope the reason for the fold: what is folded is the included, the inherent. It can be stated that what is folded is only virtual and currently exists only in an envelope, in something that envelops it." [22]
"Leibniz can define extension (extensio) as "continuous repetition" of the situs or position -- that is, of point of view: not that extension is therefore the attribute of point of view, but that the attribute of space (spatium), an order of distances between points of view, is what makes this repetition possible." [20]
"Such is the basis of perspectivism, which does not mean a dependence in respect to a pregiven or defined subject; to the contrary, a subject will be what comes to the point of view, or rather what remains in the point of view ... A needed relation exists between variation and point of view: not simply because of the variety of points of view ... but in the first place because every point of view is a point of view on variation ... For Leibniz, for Nietzsche, for William and Henry James, and for Whitehead as well, perspectivism amounts to a relativism, but not the relativism we take for granted. It is not a variation of truth according to the subject, but the condition in which the truth of a variation appears to the subject. This is the very idea of Baroque perspective." [20]
"The new status of the object no longer refers its condition to a spatial mold -- in other words, to a relation of form-matter -- but to a temporary modulation that implies as much the beginnings of a continuous variation of matter as a continuous development of form ... His [Leibniz's] is not only a temporal but also a qualitative conception of the object, to the extent that sounds and colors are flexible and taken in modulation. The object here is manneristic, not essentializing: it becomes an event." [19]
"The definition of Baroque mathematics is born with Leibniz. The object of the discipline is a "new affection" of variable sizes, which is variation itself." [17]
"Everything changes when fluctuation is made to intervene in the place of internal homothesis. It is no longer possible to determine an angular point between two others, no matter how close one is to the other; but there remains the latitude to always add a detour by making each interval the site of a new folding. That is how we go from fold to fold and not from point to point, and how every contour is blurred to give definition to the formal powers of the raw material, which rise to the surface and are put forward as so many detours and supplementary folds." [17]
"Thus inflection is the pure Event of the line or of the point, the Virtual, ideality par excellence." [15]
"Inflection is the ideal genetic element of the variable curve or fold. Inflection is the authentic atom, the elastic point. That is what Klee extracts as the genetic element of the active, spontaneous line." [14]
Chapter 1: The Pleats of Matter:
"It is because the Fold is always between two folds, and because the between-two-folds seems to move about everywhere: Is it between inorganic bodies and organisms, between organisms and animal souls, between animal souls and reasonable souls, between bodies and souls in general?" [13]
"Unity of movement is an affair of the soul, and almost of a conscience, as Bergson will later discover." [12]
"In the Baroque the soul entertains a complex relation with the body. Forever indissociable from the body, it discovers a vertiginous animality that gets it tangled in the pleats of matter, but also an organic or cerebral humanity (the degree of development) that allows it to rise up, and that will make it ascend over all the other folds." [11]
"Here is the great difference that makes Leibniz break away from Malebranche: not only is there a preformation of bodies, but also a preexistence of souls in fertile seeds. Life is not only everywhere, but souls are everywhere in matter." [11]
"With epigenesis the organic fold is produced, is unearthed, or is pushed up from a relatively smooth and consistent surface. (How could a redoubling, an invagination, or an intubation be prefigured?)" [10]
"The organism is defined by its ability to fold its own parts and to unfold them, not to infinity, but to a degree of development assigned to each species. Thus an organism is enveloped by organisms, one within another (interlocking of germinal matter), like Russian dolls. The first fly contains the seeds of all flies to come, each being called in its turn to unfold its own parts at the right time. And when an organism dies, it does not really vanish, but folds in upon itself, abruptly involuting into the again newly dormant seed by skipping all intermediate stages." [8]
"It remains the case that the organic body thus confers an interior on matter, by which the principle of individuation is applied to it: whence the figure of the leaves of a tree, two never being exactly alike because of their veins or folds." [8]
"An organism is defined by endogenous folds, while inorganic matter has exogenous folds that are always determined from without or by the surrounding environment." [7]
"If the world is infinitely cavernous, if worlds exist in the tiniest bodies, it is because everywhere there can be found "a spirit in matter," which attests not only to the infinite division of parts but also to progressivity in the gain and loss of movements all the while conservation of force is realized." [7]
"A fold is always folded within a fold, like a cavern in a cavern. The unit of matter, the smallest element of the labyrinth, is the fold, not the point which is never a part, but a simple extremity of the line ... The model for the sciences of matter is the "origami," as the Japanese philosopher might say, or the art of folding paper." [6]
"Dividing endlessly, the parts of matter form little vortices in a maelstrom, and in these are found even more vortices, even smaller, and even more are spinning in the concave intervals of the whirls that touch one another." [5]
"Wölfflin noted that the Baroque is marked by a certain number of material traits: horizontal widening of the lower floor, flattening of the pediment, low and curved stairs that push into space; matter handled in masses or aggregates, with the rounding of angles and avoidance of perpendiculars; the circular acanthus replacing the jagged acanthus, use of limestone to produce spongy, cavernous shapes, or to constitute a vortical form always put in motion by renewed turbulence, which ends only in the manner of a horse's mane or the foam of a wave; matter tends to spill over in space, to be reconciled with fluidity at the same time fluids themselves are divided into masses." [4]
"It is the upper floor that has no windows. It is a dark room or chamber decorated only with a stretched canvas "diversified by folds," as if it were a living dermis. Placed on the opaque canvas, these folds, cords, or springs represent an innate form of knowledge, but when solicited by matter they move into action." [4]
"The multiple is not only what has many parts but also what is folded in many ways." [3]
The Fold (1988; trans 1993)
Gilles Deleuze
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