"Linearity precludes the possibility of of uttering two words simultaneously. They must be arranged consecutively in spoken sequence." [170]
"Everything we have said so far comes down to this.
In the language itself, there are only differences. Even more important than that is the fact that, although in general a difference presupposes positive terms between which the difference holds, in a language there are only differences,
and no positive terms. Where we take the signification or the signal, the language includes neither ideas nor sounds existing prior to the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonetic differences arising out of that system." [166]
"In French, for instance, the fact that
r is usually pronounced as a uvular consonant does not prevent many speakers from pronouncing it as an apical trill. It makes no difference to the French language, which requires only that
r should be distinct from other consonants. There is not necessity that it be pronounced always in exactly the same way. I can even pronounce a French
r like the German
ch in
Bach,
doch, etc.; whereas I could not in German substitute
r for
ch because German, unlike French, distinguishes between
r and
ch." [164-5]
"In any case, it is impossible that sound, as a material elements, should in itself be part of the language. Sound is merely something ancillary, a material the language uses. All conventional values have the characteristic of being distinct from the tangible element which serves as their vehicle. It is not the metal in a coin which determines its value. A crown piece nominally worth five francs contains only half that sum in silver. Its value varies somewhat according to the effigy it bears. It is worth rather more or rather less on different sides of a political frontier. Considerations of the same3 order are even more pertinent to linguistic signals. Linguistic signals are not in essence phonetic. They are not physical in any way. They are constituted solely by differences which distinguish one such sound pattern from another." [164]
"Just as the conceptual part of linguistic value is determined solely by relations and differences with other signs in the language, so the same is true of its material part. The sound of a word is not in itself important, but the phonetic contrasts which allow us to distinguish that word from any other. This is what carries the meaning." [163]
"A language is a system in which all the elements fit together, and in which the value of any one element depends on the simultaneous coexistence of all the others." [159]
"Linguistics, then, operates along this margin, where sound and thought meet.
The contact between them gives rise to a form, not a substance." [157]
"In order to realise that the language itself can be nothing other than a system of pure values, one need only consider the two elements which are involved in the way it functions: ideas and sounds. Psychologically, setting aside its expression in words, our thought is simply a vague, shapeless mass. Philosophers and linguists have always agreed that were it not for signs, we should be incapable of differentiating any two ideas in a clear and constant way. In itself, thought is like a swirling cloud, where no shape is intrinsically determinate. No ideas are established in advance, and nothing is distinct, before the introduction of linguistic structure. But do sounds, which lie outside this nebulous world of thought, in themselves constitute entities established in advance? No more than ideas do. The substance of sound is no more fixed or rigid than that of thought. It does not offer a ready-made mould, with shapes that thought must inevitably conform to. It is a malleable material which can be fashioned into separate parts in order to supply the signals which thought has need of." [155]
"From a practical point of view, it would be of interest to begin with units; to determine units, and recognize the various kinds of units by providing a classification. It would be necessary to examine what the basis is for division into words. For the word, in spite of being so difficult to define, is a unit which compels recognition by the mind. It has a central role in the linguistic mechanism. (But a discussion of that topic alone would fill a book.) Then one would proceed to classify smaller units, larger units, and so on. By determining in this way the elements to be dealt with, a science of linguistics would fully achieve its goals, having related all relevant phenomena in its domain to one first principle. It cannot be said that this central problem has ever been tackled, or that the scope and difficulty of it have been realised. Where languages are concerned, people have always been satisfied to work with poorly defined units." [154]
"In most scientific domains, the question of units does not even arise: they are given in advance. In zoology, the animal is the obvious unit. In astronomy, likewise, there are items already separated out in space: the stars, planets, etc. In chemistry, one can study the nature and composition of bichromate of potash without worrying for a moment about whether it is a well defined object. When a science offers no immediately recognizable concrete units, that means they are not essential. In history, for example, is the unit the individual, the epoch, or the nation? No one knows. But does it matter? To study history it is not at all necessary to decide. But just as chess is based entirely on the combinations afforded by the various pieces, so too a language has the character of a system based entirely on the contrasts between its concrete units. One cannot dispense with identifying them, nor move a step without having recourse to them. And yet delimiting them is such a tricky problem that one is led to ask whether they are really there. A language thus has this curious and striking feature. It has no immediately perceptible entities. And yet one cannot doubt that they exist, or that the interplay of these units is what constitutes linguistic structure. That is undoubtedly a characteristic which distinguishes languages from all other semiological institutions." [149]
"The word as a unit is not made up simply of a set of sounds: it depends on other characteristics than its material nature. Imagine that one note on a piano is out of tune. Every time this note is played in the performance of a piece, there will be a false note. But where? In the melody? Surely not. Nothing has happened to the melody, only to the piano. It is exactly the same in the case of sound change. The sound systems is the instrument we play in order to articulate the words of the language. If one element in the sound system changes, this may have various results; but in itself, the fact does not affect the words, for they are, so to speak, the melodies in our repertoire." [134]
"If we cut crosswise through the stem of a plant, we can observe a rather complex pattern on the surface revealed by the cut. What we are looking at is a section of the plant's longitudinal fibres. These fibres will be revealed if we now make a second cut perpendicular to the first. Again in this example, one perspective depends on the other." [125]
"A language is a system of which all the parts can and must be considered as synchronically interdependent." [124]
"A stress law, like everything else in a linguistic system, is an arrangement of elements, the fortuitous and involuntary outcome of evolution." [123]
"But in order to mark this contrast more effectively, and the intersection of two orders of phenomena relating to the same object of study, we shall speak for preference of
synchronic linguistics and
diachronic linguistics. Everything is synchronic which relates to the static aspect of our science, and diachronic everything which concerns evolution. Likewise
synchrony and
diachrony will designate respectively a linguistic state and a phase of evolution." [117]
"Ultimately there is a connexion between these two opposing factors: the arbitrary convention which allows free choice, and the passage of time, which fixes that choice. It is because the linguistic sign is arbitrary that it knows no other law than that of tradition, and because it is founded upon tradition that it can be arbitrary." [108]
"... the inventory of signs in any language is countless." [107]
"At any given period, however far back in time we go, a language is always an inheritance from the past. The initial assignment of names to things, establishing a contract between concepts and sound patterns, is an act we can conceive in the imagination, but no one has ever observed it taking place. The idea that it might have happened is suggested to us by our keen awareness of the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign." [105]
"The signal, in relation to the idea it represents, may seem to be freely chosen. However, from the point of view of the linguistic community, the signal is imposed rather than freely chosen. Speakers are not consulted about its choice. Once the language has selected a signal, it cannot be freely replaced by any other." [104]
"... if I stress a certain syllable, it may seem that I am presenting a number of significant features simultaneously. But that is an illusion. They syllable and its accentuation constitute a single act of phonation. There is no duality within this act, although there are various contrasts with what precedes and follows." [103]
"Unlike visual signals (e.g. ships' flags) which can exploit more than one dimension simultaneously, auditory signals have available to them only the linearity of time. The elements of such signals are presented one after another: they form a chain. This feature appears immediately when they are represented in writing, and a spatial line of graphic signs is substituted for a succession of sounds in time." [103]
"The word
symbol is sometimes used to designate the linguistic sign, or more exactly that part of the linguistic sign which we are calling the signal. This use of the word
symbol is awkward, for reasons connected with our first principle. For it is characteristic of symbols that they are never entirely arbitrary. They are not empty configurations. They show at least a vestige of natural connexion between the signal and its signification. For instance, our symbol of justice, the scales, could hardly be replaced by a chariot." [101]
"The link between signal and signification is arbitrary. Since we are treating a sign as the combination in which a signal is associated with a signification, we can express this more simply as:
the linguistic sign is arbitrary." [100]
"A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but between a concept and a sound pattern." [98]
"This means that a bridging movement may then be necessary in order to reach the position of the vocal organs required for the articulation of the second speech sound. Thus while pronouncing the
s in a group
sp, the lips must begin to close in preparation for the opening
p which follows. But experience teaches us that such bridging movements produce nothing audible, other than one of those fleeting sounds which we can ignore, and which do not in any case interrupt the articulation of the sequence." [84]
"Freedom to link sound types in succession is limited by the possibility of combining the right articulatory movements. To account for what happens in these combinations, we need a science which treats combinations rather like algebraic equations. A binary group will imply a certain number of articulatory and auditory features imposing conditions upon each other, in such a way that when one of them varies there will be a necessary alternation of the others which can be calculated." [79]
"There are special treatises, particularly by English phoneticians, devoted to minute descriptions of the sounds of language." [77]
"For the sign always to some extent eludes control by the will, whether of the individual or of society: that is its essential nature, even though it may be by no means obvious at first sight." [34]
"A language is a system of signs expressing ideas, and hence comparable to writing, the deaf-and-dumb alphabet, symbolic rites, forms of politeness, military signals, and so on. It is simply the most important of such systems. It is therefore possible to conceive of a science
which studies the role of signs as part of social life. It would form part of social psychology, and hence of general psychology. We shall call it
semiology (from the Greek
sēmîon, 'sign'). It would investigate the nature of signs and the laws governing them. Since it does not yet exist, one cannot say for certain that it will exist. But it has a right to exist, a place ready for it in advance. Linguistics is only one branch of this general science. The laws which semiology will discover will be laws applicable in linguistics, and linguistics will thus be assigned to a clearly defined place in the field of human knowledge." [33]
"The utterance of a word, however small, involves an infinite number of muscular movements extremely difficult to examine and to represent. In linguistic structure, on the contrary, there is only the sound pattern, and this can be represented by one constant visual image. For if one leaves out of account that multitude of movements required to actualise it in speech, each sound pattern, as we shall see, is only the sum a limited number of elements or speech sounds, and these can in turn be represented by a corresponding number of symbols in writing." [32]
"Language in its entirety has many different and disparate aspects. It lies astride the boundaries separating various domains. It is at the same time physical, physiological and psychological. It belongs both to the individual and to society. No classification of human phenomena provides any single place for it, because language as such has no discernible unity." [25]
"
The linguist must take the study of linguistic structure as his primary concern, and relate all other manifestations of language to it. Indeed, amid so many dualities, linguistic structure seems to be the one thing that is independently definable and provides something our minds can satisfactorily grasp." [25]
"Language at any given time involves an established system and an evolution. At any given time, it is an institution in the present and a product of the past." [24]
"Suppose someone pronounces the French word
nu ('naked'). At first sight, one might think this would be an example of an independently given linguistic object. But more careful consideration reveals a series of three or four quite different things, depending on the viewpoint adopted. There is a sound, there is the expression of an idea, there is a derivative of Latin
nūdum, and so on. The object is not given in advance of the viewpoint: far from it. Rather, one might say that it is the viewpoint adopted which creates the object. Furthermore, there is nothing to tell us in advance whether one of these ways of looking at it is prior to or superior to any of the others." [23]
"The connexions between linguistics and physiology are less difficult to unravel. The relation is unilateral, in that the study of languages requires information about the physiological aspects of sound, but can supply physiology with no information in return. In any case, confusion between the two disciplines is impossible. The essence of a language, as we shall see, has nothing to do with the phonic nature of the linguistic sign." [21]
"To require that one should restrict oneself to a linguistic terminology corresponding to linguistic realities is to presuppose that we have already solved the mysteries surrounding these realities. But this is far from being the case." [19]
Course in General Linguistics (1916)
Ferdinand de Saussure
