Monday, April 12, 2010

The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact

"Any created object, visual or analytic, conceptual or photographic, has to condense all the dimensions of the game into a single one: the allegorical, the presentative (mimicry), the agonal (agon), the random (alea) and the vertigious (ilinx). Recomposing the spectrum. A work, an object, a piece of architecture, a photograph, but equally a crime or an event, must: be the allegory of something, be a challenge to someone, bring chance into pay and produce vertigo." [215]

"The more daily life is eroded, routinized and interactivized, the more we must counter this trend with complex, initiatory sets of rules." [215]

"According to Ilya Prigogine, we intuitively sense the irreversibility of physical phenomena and time's arrow is irreversible. But we may hypothesize a reversible process at the very heart of time, and at the very heart of thought. A dual arrow of time, a dual arrow of thought (according to some scientists, the elementary physical laws are reversible, that is to say, their mathematical expression is unchanged if the temporal variable is reversed). How can we reconcile this reversibility with the irreversibility we observe on the basis of the commonplace intuition we have of time?" [201]

"Every process growing exponentially generates a barrier: the speed barrier, the heat barrier, the information barrier, the transparency barrier, the Virtual barrier. And that barrier is insuperable." [192]

"The feminine and the masculine are not 'interactive': that is ridiculous. Life and the world are not interactive -- life isn't a question-and-answer session or a video game. There is nothing interactive in words when they are articulated in language. Interactivity is a gigantic mythology, a mythology of integrated systems craving integration, a mythology in which otherness is lost in feedback, interlocution and interface -- a kind of generalized echography." [188]

"On the symbolic plane there is only one way to pay back, and that is the counter-gift. If that is impossible, then there is vengeance, which is itself a form of counter-gift. Compassion here is useless and perverse: it merely adds to the inferiority of the victim. Moreover, this ruse of repentance is a particularly underhand manoeuvre on the part of those in power, since it means stealing from the people the last of their rights, their only opportunity for political participation: the chance to unmask and condemn the powerful. It is the same with the media and the news sources when they put themselves in the dock and engage in self-criticism. They rob the public of the last of their rights as citizens -- the right not to believe a single word they are told. Just as advertising, by affecting a self-deprecating ironic tone, short-circuits our opportunities for deriding it. This kind of deterrence is at work everywhere: 'citizens' are deprived of their right of revenge and their capacity to take reprisals." [171]

"The corruption of ideas is no exception. They too follow a much more cynical, subtle trajectory than the pathways of reason, and the networks of thought that are created bear only a distant relation to truth. It is this cunning which means that, as soon as they are invested with power, politicians immediately turn against that which, or those who, carried them to power, just as intellectuals very quickly turn against the verg ideas that inspired them." [169]

"Such is 'real time', the time of communication, information and perpetual interaction: the finest deterrence-space of time and events. On the real-time screen, by way of simple digital manipulation, all possibilities are potentially realized -- which puts an end to their possibility. Through electronics and cybernetics, all desires, all play of identity and all interactive potentialities are programmed in and auto-programmed. The fact that everything here is realized from the outset prevents the emergence of any singular event. Such is the violence of real time, which is also the violence of information." [132]

"Art has always denied itself. But once it did so through excess, thrilling to the play of its disappearance. Today it denies itself by default -- worse, it denies its own death. It immerses itself in reality, instead of being the agent of the symbolic murder of that same reality, instead of being the magical operator of its disappearance." [112]

"Art, in its form, signifies nothing. It is merely a sign pointing towards absence. But what becomes of this perspective of emptiness and absence in a contemporary universe that is already totally emptied of its meaning and reality? Art can now only align itself with the general insignificance and indifference. It no longer has any privileged status. It no longer has any other final destination than this fluid universe of communication, the networks and interaction." [109]

"The idea of art has become rarefied and minimal, leading ultimately to conceptual art, where it ends in the nonexhibition of non-works in non-galleries -- the apotheosis of art as non-event. As a corollary, the consumer circulates in all this in order to experience his non-enjoyment of the works." [107]

"What could miraculously reassure us today about the essence of art? Art is quite simply what is at issue in the world of art, in that desperately self-obsessed artistic community. The 'creative' act doubles up on itself and is now nothing more than a sign of its own operation -- the painter's true subject is no longer what he paints but the very fact that he paints. He paints in the fact that he paints. At least in that way the idea art remains intact." [107]


"Do we not prefer any old parallel universe to the real one? Any old double life to the one given to us? There is no finer parallel universe than that of the detail or the fragment. Freed from the whole and its transcendent ventriloquism, the detail inevitably becomes mysterious. Every particle wrested from the natural world is in itself an immediate subversion of the real and its wholeness. Like the fragment, it has only to be elliptical. It has only to be an exception." [103]

"The silence of the image is equalled only by the silence of the masses and the silence of the desert." [102]


"Objects are merely a pretext for light. If there were no objects, light would circulate endlessly and we would not even be aware of it. If there were no subjects, thought would circulate infinitely and there would not even be any echo of it in consciousn ess. The subject is that upon which thought comes to rest in its infinite circulation, that against which it reflects. The object is that upon which light comes to rest, that which reflects it. The photograph is the automatic writing of light." [102]

"Lichtenberg speaks, in one of his aphorisms, of a tremor: any act, even an exact one, is preceded by a trembling, a haziness of gesture, and it always retains something of it. When this haziness, this tremor, does not exist, when an act is purely operational and is perfectly focused, we are on the verge of madness." [99]

"The photographic image is the purest because it simulates neither time nor movement and confines itself to the most rigorous unreality. All the other forms (cinema, video, computer-generated images) are merely attenuated forms of the pure image and its rupture with the real." [97]

"The ultimate violence done to the image is the violence of the computer-generated image, which emerged ex nihilo from numerical calculation and the computer. There is an end here to the very imagining of the image, to its fundamental 'illusion', since in the process of computer-generation the referent no longer exists and the real itself no longer has cause to come to pass, being produced immediately as Virtual Reality. There is an end here to that direct image-taking, that presence to a real object in an irrevocable instant, which created the magical illusion of the photograph and made the image a singular event." [95]

"Images that ultimately bear witness, behind their alleged 'objectivity', to a deep disavowal of the real, at the same time as a disavowal of the image, which is assigned the task of representing that which does not want to be represented, of violating the real by 'breaking and entering'. In this sense, most photographs (but media images too, in general, and all that makes up the 'visual') are not true images. They are merely reportage, realist cliché or aesthetic performance, enslaved to all the ideological systems." [93]

"The Iconoclasts of Byzantium smashed images to erase their signification (the visible face of God). While apparently doing the opposite, and in spite of our cult of idols, we are still iconoclasts: we destroy images by overloading them with signification; we kill images with meaning." [92]

"Of news coverage we are the hostages, but we also treat it as a spectacle, consume it as spectacle, without regard for its credibility. A latent incredulity and derision prevent us from being totally in the grip of the information media. It isn't critical consciousness that causes us to distance ourselves from it in this way, but the reflex of no longer wanting to play the game. Somewhere in us lies a profound desire not to have information and transparency (nor perhaps freedom and democracy -- all this needs looking at again). Towards all these ideals of modernity there is something like a collective form of mental reserve, of innate immunity." [84-5]

"People tell you the computer is just a handier, more complex kind of typewriter. But that isn't true. The typewriter is an entirely external object. The page floats free, and so do I. I have a physical relation to writing. I touch the blank o written page with my eyes -- something I cannot do with the scree. The computer is a prosthesis. I have a tactile, intersensorty relation to it. I become, myself, an ectoplasm of the screen." [81-2]

"And is there really any possibility of discovering something in cyberspace? The Internet merely simulates a free mental space of freedom and discovery. In fact, it merely offers a multiple but conventional space, in which the operator interacts with known elements, pre-existent sites, established codes. Nothing exists beyond its search parameters. Every question has an anticipated response assigned to it. You are the questioner and, at the same time, the automatic answering device of the machine. Both coder and decoders -- you are, in fact, your own terminal. That is the ectasy of communication. There is no 'Other' out there and no final destination. It's any old destination -- and any old interactor will do. And so the system goes on, without end and without finality, and its only possibility is that of infinite involution. Hence the comfortable vertig of this electronic, computer interaction, which acts like a drug. You can spend your whole life at this, without a break. Drugs themselves are only ever the perfect example of a crazed, closed-circuity interactivity." [81]

"Machines produce only machines. The texts, images, films, speech and programmes which come out of the computer are machine products, and they bear the marks of such products: they are artificially padded-out, face-lifted by the machine, the films are stuffed with special effects, the texts full of longueurs and repetitions due to the machine's malicious will to function at all costs (that is its passion), and to the operator's fascination with this limitless possibility of functioning. Hence the wearisome character in films of all this violence and pornographied sexuality, which are merely special effects of violence and sex, no longer even fantasized by humans, but pure machinic violence. And this explains all these texts that resemble the work of 'intelligent' virtual agents, whose only act is the act of programming. This has nothing to do with automatic writing, which played on the magical telescoping of words and concepts, whereas all we have here is the automatism of programming, an automatic run-through of all the possibilities. It is this phantasm of the ideal performance of the text or image, the possibility of correcting endlessly, which produce in the 'creative artist' this vertige of interactivity with his own object, alongside the anxious vertige at not having reached the technological limits of his possibilities." [80-1]

"In the mirror we differentiate ourselves from our image, we enter upon an open form of alienation and of play with it. The mirror, the image, the gaze, the scene -- all these things open on to a culture of metaphor. Whereas in the operation of the Virtual, at a certain level of immersion in the visual machinery, the man / machine distinction no longer holds: the machine is on both sides of the interface. Perhaps you are indeed merely the machine's space now -- the human being having become the virtual reality of the machine, its mirror operator. This has to do with the very essence of the screen. There is no 'through' the screen the way there is a 'through' the looking-glass or mirror. The dimensions of time itself merge there in 'real time'. And, the characteristic of any virtual surface being first of all to be there, to be empty and thus capable of being filled with anything whatever, it is left to you to enter, in real time, into interactivity with the void." [80]

"What are we to do with an interactive world in which the demarcation line between subject and object is virtually abolished? That world can no longer either be reflected or represented; it can only be refracted or diffracted now by operations that are, without distinction, operations of brain and screen -- the mental operations of a brain that has itself become a screen." [78]

"The screen reflects nothing. It is as though you are behind the a two-way mirror: you see the world, but it doesn't see you, it doesn't look at you. Now, you only see things if they are looking at you. The screen screens out any dual relation (any possibility of 'response'). It is this failure of representation which, together with a failure of action, underlies the impossibility of developing an ethics of information, an ethics of images, an ethics of the Virtual and the networks. All attempts in that direction inevitably fail. All that remains is the mental diaspora of images and the extravagant performance of the medium." [78]

"It is the same with text, with any 'virtual' text (the Internet, word-processing): you work on it like a computer-generated image, which no longer bears any relation to the transcendence of the gaze or of writing. At any rate, as soon as you are in front of the screen, you no longer see the text as a text, but as an image. Now, it is in the strict separation of text and screen, of text and image, that writing is an activity in its own right, never an interaction." [76]

"When an event and the broadcasting of that event in real time are too close together, the event is rendered undecidable and virtual; it is stripped of its historical dimension and removed from memory. We are in a generalized feedback effect. Wherever a mingling of this kind -- a collision of poles -- occurs, then the vital tension is discharged. Even in 'reality TV', where, in the live telling of the story, the immediate televisual acting, we see the confusion of existence and its double." [75]

"This is the fall of dreams into the psychical domain, 'the fall of the imagination into the psychological swamp' (Hélé Béji). This fall into the psychical domain means, in fact, that dreams no longer have any prophetic value: to do so they would have to originate in a transcendence, the transcendence of night, and come from elsewhere, whereas they are now merely a mode of interaction with oneself." [70]

"Now, what makes exchange possible if not the abstract transcendence of value? What makes the exchange of language possible if not the abstract transcendence of the sign? It is all these things that are eliminated today, ground to dust. The same vertiginous deregulation is visited on both value and the sign. Not the real, but the sign and, through it, the whole universe of meaning and communication is undergoing the same deregulation as markets (doubtless it even preceded the deregulation of the world market)." [67-8]

"We have abolished the real world. What world remains, then? The world of signs? Not at all. We have put paid to the real world and, in the process, done away with that of the sign. It is the murder of the sign that paves the way for Integral Reality." [67]

"If the people puts itself in the hands of the political class, it does so more to be rid of power than out of any desire for representation. We may interpret this as a sign of passivity and irresponsibility, but why not venture a subtler hypothesis: namely, that this passing of the buck proceeds from an unwittingly lucid intuition of an absence of desire and will of their own -- in short, a secret awareness of the illusoriness of freedom?" [54]

"Reality will have been only a fleeting solution then. Indeed, it merely succeeded others, such as the religious illusion in all its forms. This truth, this rationality, this objective reality -- which we took in exchange for religious values, imagining that we had moved definitively beyond them -- is only the disenchanted heir to those same religious values. It does not seem ever genuinely to have gained the upper hand, as it happens, nor does it appear that the transcendent solution is entirely past and gone or that God is dead, even though we now deal only with his metastases." [43]

"If thought cannot be exchanged for reality, then the immediate denial of reality becomes the only reality-based thinking. But this denial does not lead to hope, as Adorno would have it: 'Hope, as it emerges from reality by struggling against it to deny it, is the only manifestation of lucidity.' Whether for good or for ill, this is not true." [36-37]

"In the end, it is the strangeness of the world that is fundamental and it is that strangeness which resists the status of objective reality. Similarly, it is our strangeness to ourselves that is fundamental and resists the status of subject. It is not a matter of resisting alienation, but of resisting the very status of subject." [36]

"Such as it is, the world is without causal explanation or possible representation (any mirror whatever would still be part of the world). Now, that for which there is neither a meaning nor a definitive reason is an illusion. The world therefore has all the characteristics of a thorough-going illusion. For us, however, whatever its metaphysical beauty, this illusion is unbearable. Hence the need to produce all the possible forms of a simulacrum of meaning, of transcendence --- things which all mask this original illusoriness and protect us from it. Thus the simulacrum is not that which hides the truth, but that which hides the absence of truth." [32]

"Immersion, immanence and immediacy -- these are the characteristics of the Virtual." [31]

"Time itself, lived time, no longer has time to take place. The historical time of events, the psychological time of affects and passion, the subjective time of judgement and will, are all simultaneously called into question by virtual time, which is called, no doubt derisively, 'real time'." [30]

"The computer-generated image is like this too, a digital image which is entirely fabricate, has no real referent and from which, by contrast with analogue images, the negative itself has disappeared -- not just the film negative, but the negative moment that lies at the heart of the image, that absence that causes the image to resonate. The technical fine-tuning here is perfect. There is no room for fuzziness, tremor or chance. Is this still an image?" [28]

"Integral Reality is also to be found in integral music: the sort you find in quadraphonic spaces or can 'compose' on a computer. The music in which sounds have been clarified and expurgated and which, shorn of all noise and static, is, so to speak, restored to its technical perfection. The sounds of such music are no longer the play of a form, but the actualization of a programme. It is a music reduced to a pure wavelength, the final reception of which, the tangible effect on the listener, is exactly programmed too, as in a closed circuit. It s, in a sense, a virtual music, flawless and without imagination, merging into its own model, and even the enjoyment of it is virtual enjoyment. Is this still music? The question must be open to doubt, since they have actually come up with the idea of reintroducing noise into it to make it more 'musical'." [27-28]

"'Does reality exist? Are we in a real world?' -- this is the leitmotiv or our entire present culture. But it merely expresses the fact that we can no longer bear this world, which is so prey to reality, except by way of a radical denial. And this is logical: since the world can no longer be justified in another world, it has to be justified here and now in this one by lending itself force of reality, by purging itself of any illusion. But at the same time, by the very effect of this counter-transference, the denial of the real as such grows. Reality, having lost its natural predators, is growing like some proliferating species. A little bit like algae or even like the human race in general. The Real is growing like the desert. 'Welcome to the Desert of the Real'. Illusion, dreams, passion, madness and drugs, but also artifice and simulacrum -- these were reality's natural predators. They have all lost energy, as though struck down by some dark, incurable malady. We have, then, to find an artificial equivalent for them, since, if we do not, reality, once it has attained its critical mass, will end up destroying itself spontaneously, will implode of its own accord -- which it is, in fact, currently doing, giving way to the Virtual in all its forms. It is in the Virtual that we have the ultimate predator and plunderer of reality, secreted by reality itself as a kind of self-destructive viral agent. Reality has fallen prey to Virtual Reality, the final consequence of the process begun with the abstraction of objective reality -- a process that ends in Integral Reality. What we have in virtuality is no longer a hinterworld: the substitution of the world is total; this is the identical doubling of the world, its perfect mirroring, and the matter is settled by the pure and simple annihilation of symbolic substance. Even objective reality becomes a useless function, a kind of waste that is ever more difficult to exchange and circulate. We have moved, then, from objective reality to a later stage, a kind of ultra-reality that puts an end to both reality and illusion." [26-27]

"The reality-fundamentalists equip themselves with a form of magical thinking that confuses message and messenger: if you speak of the simulacrum, then you are a simulator; if you speak of the virtuality of war, then you are in league with it have no regard for the hundreds of thousands of dead." [23]

"Any questioning of reality, of its obviousness and its principle, is deemed unacceptable and condemned as negationist. The charge against you: what do you make of the reality of misery, suffering and death? Now, it isn't about taking sides on material violence or on the violence of misfortune -- it is about a line you are forbidden to cross, the line marking a taboo on reality, a taboo also on even the slightest attempt at interfering with a clear division between good and evil, on pain of being regarded as a scoundrel or an imposter. The affirmation or contestation of reality, of the reality principle, is, then, a political choice, and almost a religious one, in that any infringement of this principle is sacrilegious -- the very hypothesis of simulation being perceived, deep down, as diabolical (it takes up where heresy left off in the archaeology of the thinking of evil)." [22-23]

"The eclipse of God left us up against reality. Where will the eclipse of reality leave us?" The Intelligence of Evil or The Lucidity Pact [21]

"Things have no origin any longer and no end, they cannot develop logically or dialectically any more, but only chaotically or randomly. They are becoming 'extreme' in the literal sense -- ex terminis: they are beyond the limits." At the reception of the Simens Media Prize

"What we also see here, too, is a characteristic recourse to a third term that stands outside the apparently given dichotomy of production / destruction: 'seduction' is, as it were, the option fro left field (Baudrillard also says it is the 'feminine' one, but that is another matter), the term that comes from outside the structure -- from 'elsewhere'. Chris Turner: The Intelligence of Evil: An Introduction, page 8.

"Deep down, things have never functioned socially, but symbolically, magically, irrationally, etc." In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, page 68.

"With the decline of psychoanalysis and sexuality as strong structures, one may catch a glimpse of another, parallel universe ... a universe that can no longer be intepreted in terms of psychic or psychological relations, nor those of repression and the unconscious, but must be interpreted in the terms of play, challenges, duels, the strategy of appearances -- that is, in the terms of seduction." Seduction, page 7.

"It is impossible to destroy the system by a contradiction-based logic or by reversing the balance of forces -- in short, by a direct, dialectical revoluion affecting the economic or political infrastructure. Everything that produces contradiction or a balance of forces or energy in general merely feeds back into the system and drives it on." Le ludique et le policier et autres textes parus dans Utopie [1967/78] page 335

Wednesday, April 7, 2010

Course on General Linguistics

"Linearity precludes the possibility of of uttering two words simultaneously. They must be arranged consecutively in spoken sequence." [170]

"Everything we have said so far comes down to this. In the language itself, there are only differences. Even more important than that is the fact that, although in general a difference presupposes positive terms between which the difference holds, in a language there are only differences, and no positive terms. Where we take the signification or the signal, the language includes neither ideas nor sounds existing prior to the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonetic differences arising out of that system." [166]

"In French, for instance, the fact that r is usually pronounced as a uvular consonant does not prevent many speakers from pronouncing it as an apical trill. It makes no difference to the French language, which requires only that r should be distinct from other consonants. There is not necessity that it be pronounced always in exactly the same way. I can even pronounce a French r like the German ch in Bach, doch, etc.; whereas I could not in German substitute r for ch because German, unlike French, distinguishes between r and ch." [164-5]

"In any case, it is impossible that sound, as a material elements, should in itself be part of the language. Sound is merely something ancillary, a material the language uses. All conventional values have the characteristic of being distinct from the tangible element which serves as their vehicle. It is not the metal in a coin which determines its value. A crown piece nominally worth five francs contains only half that sum in silver. Its value varies somewhat according to the effigy it bears. It is worth rather more or rather less on different sides of a political frontier. Considerations of the same3 order are even more pertinent to linguistic signals. Linguistic signals are not in essence phonetic. They are not physical in any way. They are constituted solely by differences which distinguish one such sound pattern from another." [164]

"Just as the conceptual part of linguistic value is determined solely by relations and differences with other signs in the language, so the same is true of its material part. The sound of a word is not in itself important, but the phonetic contrasts which allow us to distinguish that word from any other. This is what carries the meaning." [163]

"A language is a system in which all the elements fit together, and in which the value of any one element depends on the simultaneous coexistence of all the others." [159]

"Linguistics, then, operates along this margin, where sound and thought meet. The contact between them gives rise to a form, not a substance." [157]

"In order to realise that the language itself can be nothing other than a system of pure values, one need only consider the two elements which are involved in the way it functions: ideas and sounds. Psychologically, setting aside its expression in words, our thought is simply a vague, shapeless mass. Philosophers and linguists have always agreed that were it not for signs, we should be incapable of differentiating any two ideas in a clear and constant way. In itself, thought is like a swirling cloud, where no shape is intrinsically determinate. No ideas are established in advance, and nothing is distinct, before the introduction of linguistic structure. But do sounds, which lie outside this nebulous world of thought, in themselves constitute entities established in advance? No more than ideas do. The substance of sound is no more fixed or rigid than that of thought. It does not offer a ready-made mould, with shapes that thought must inevitably conform to. It is a malleable material which can be fashioned into separate parts in order to supply the signals which thought has need of." [155]

"From a practical point of view, it would be of interest to begin with units; to determine units, and recognize the various kinds of units by providing a classification. It would be necessary to examine what the basis is for division into words. For the word, in spite of being so difficult to define, is a unit which compels recognition by the mind. It has a central role in the linguistic mechanism. (But a discussion of that topic alone would fill a book.) Then one would proceed to classify smaller units, larger units, and so on. By determining in this way the elements to be dealt with, a science of linguistics would fully achieve its goals, having related all relevant phenomena in its domain to one first principle. It cannot be said that this central problem has ever been tackled, or that the scope and difficulty of it have been realised. Where languages are concerned, people have always been satisfied to work with poorly defined units." [154]

"In most scientific domains, the question of units does not even arise: they are given in advance. In zoology, the animal is the obvious unit. In astronomy, likewise, there are items already separated out in space: the stars, planets, etc. In chemistry, one can study the nature and composition of bichromate of potash without worrying for a moment about whether it is a well defined object. When a science offers no immediately recognizable concrete units, that means they are not essential. In history, for example, is the unit the individual, the epoch, or the nation? No one knows. But does it matter? To study history it is not at all necessary to decide. But just as chess is based entirely on the combinations afforded by the various pieces, so too a language has the character of a system based entirely on the contrasts between its concrete units. One cannot dispense with identifying them, nor move a step without having recourse to them. And yet delimiting them is such a tricky problem that one is led to ask whether they are really there. A language thus has this curious and striking feature. It has no immediately perceptible entities. And yet one cannot doubt that they exist, or that the interplay of these units is what constitutes linguistic structure. That is undoubtedly a characteristic which distinguishes languages from all other semiological institutions." [149]

"The word as a unit is not made up simply of a set of sounds: it depends on other characteristics than its material nature. Imagine that one note on a piano is out of tune. Every time this note is played in the performance of a piece, there will be a false note. But where? In the melody? Surely not. Nothing has happened to the melody, only to the piano. It is exactly the same in the case of sound change. The sound systems is the instrument we play in order to articulate the words of the language. If one element in the sound system changes, this may have various results; but in itself, the fact does not affect the words, for they are, so to speak, the melodies in our repertoire." [134]

"If we cut crosswise through the stem of a plant, we can observe a rather complex pattern on the surface revealed by the cut. What we are looking at is a section of the plant's longitudinal fibres. These fibres will be revealed if we now make a second cut perpendicular to the first. Again in this example, one perspective depends on the other." [125]

"A language is a system of which all the parts can and must be considered as synchronically interdependent." [124]

"A stress law, like everything else in a linguistic system, is an arrangement of elements, the fortuitous and involuntary outcome of evolution." [123]

"But in order to mark this contrast more effectively, and the intersection of two orders of phenomena relating to the same object of study, we shall speak for preference of synchronic linguistics and diachronic linguistics. Everything is synchronic which relates to the static aspect of our science, and diachronic everything which concerns evolution. Likewise synchrony and diachrony will designate respectively a linguistic state and a phase of evolution." [117]

"Ultimately there is a connexion between these two opposing factors: the arbitrary convention which allows free choice, and the passage of time, which fixes that choice. It is because the linguistic sign is arbitrary that it knows no other law than that of tradition, and because it is founded upon tradition that it can be arbitrary." [108]

"... the inventory of signs in any language is countless." [107]

"At any given period, however far back in time we go, a language is always an inheritance from the past. The initial assignment of names to things, establishing a contract between concepts and sound patterns, is an act we can conceive in the imagination, but no one has ever observed it taking place. The idea that it might have happened is suggested to us by our keen awareness of the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign." [105]

"The signal, in relation to the idea it represents, may seem to be freely chosen. However, from the point of view of the linguistic community, the signal is imposed rather than freely chosen. Speakers are not consulted about its choice. Once the language has selected a signal, it cannot be freely replaced by any other." [104]

"... if I stress a certain syllable, it may seem that I am presenting a number of significant features simultaneously. But that is an illusion. They syllable and its accentuation constitute a single act of phonation. There is no duality within this act, although there are various contrasts with what precedes and follows." [103]

"Unlike visual signals (e.g. ships' flags) which can exploit more than one dimension simultaneously, auditory signals have available to them only the linearity of time. The elements of such signals are presented one after another: they form a chain. This feature appears immediately when they are represented in writing, and a spatial line of graphic signs is substituted for a succession of sounds in time." [103]

"The word symbol is sometimes used to designate the linguistic sign, or more exactly that part of the linguistic sign which we are calling the signal. This use of the word symbol is awkward, for reasons connected with our first principle. For it is characteristic of symbols that they are never entirely arbitrary. They are not empty configurations. They show at least a vestige of natural connexion between the signal and its signification. For instance, our symbol of justice, the scales, could hardly be replaced by a chariot." [101]

"The link between signal and signification is arbitrary. Since we are treating a sign as the combination in which a signal is associated with a signification, we can express this more simply as: the linguistic sign is arbitrary." [100]

"A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but between a concept and a sound pattern." [98]

"This means that a bridging movement may then be necessary in order to reach the position of the vocal organs required for the articulation of the second speech sound. Thus while pronouncing the s in a group sp, the lips must begin to close in preparation for the opening p which follows. But experience teaches us that such bridging movements produce nothing audible, other than one of those fleeting sounds which we can ignore, and which do not in any case interrupt the articulation of the sequence." [84]

"Freedom to link sound types in succession is limited by the possibility of combining the right articulatory movements. To account for what happens in these combinations, we need a science which treats combinations rather like algebraic equations. A binary group will imply a certain number of articulatory and auditory features imposing conditions upon each other, in such a way that when one of them varies there will be a necessary alternation of the others which can be calculated." [79]

"There are special treatises, particularly by English phoneticians, devoted to minute descriptions of the sounds of language." [77]

"For the sign always to some extent eludes control by the will, whether of the individual or of society: that is its essential nature, even though it may be by no means obvious at first sight." [34]

"A language is a system of signs expressing ideas, and hence comparable to writing, the deaf-and-dumb alphabet, symbolic rites, forms of politeness, military signals, and so on. It is simply the most important of such systems. It is therefore possible to conceive of a science which studies the role of signs as part of social life. It would form part of social psychology, and hence of general psychology. We shall call it semiology (from the Greek sēmîon, 'sign'). It would investigate the nature of signs and the laws governing them. Since it does not yet exist, one cannot say for certain that it will exist. But it has a right to exist, a place ready for it in advance. Linguistics is only one branch of this general science. The laws which semiology will discover will be laws applicable in linguistics, and linguistics will thus be assigned to a clearly defined place in the field of human knowledge." [33]

"The utterance of a word, however small, involves an infinite number of muscular movements extremely difficult to examine and to represent. In linguistic structure, on the contrary, there is only the sound pattern, and this can be represented by one constant visual image. For if one leaves out of account that multitude of movements required to actualise it in speech, each sound pattern, as we shall see, is only the sum a limited number of elements or speech sounds, and these can in turn be represented by a corresponding number of symbols in writing." [32]

"Language in its entirety has many different and disparate aspects. It lies astride the boundaries separating various domains. It is at the same time physical, physiological and psychological. It belongs both to the individual and to society. No classification of human phenomena provides any single place for it, because language as such has no discernible unity." [25]

"The linguist must take the study of linguistic structure as his primary concern, and relate all other manifestations of language to it. Indeed, amid so many dualities, linguistic structure seems to be the one thing that is independently definable and provides something our minds can satisfactorily grasp." [25]

"Language at any given time involves an established system and an evolution. At any given time, it is an institution in the present and a product of the past." [24]

"Suppose someone pronounces the French word nu ('naked'). At first sight, one might think this would be an example of an independently given linguistic object. But more careful consideration reveals a series of three or four quite different things, depending on the viewpoint adopted. There is a sound, there is the expression of an idea, there is a derivative of Latin nūdum, and so on. The object is not given in advance of the viewpoint: far from it. Rather, one might say that it is the viewpoint adopted which creates the object. Furthermore, there is nothing to tell us in advance whether one of these ways of looking at it is prior to or superior to any of the others." [23]

"The connexions between linguistics and physiology are less difficult to unravel. The relation is unilateral, in that the study of languages requires information about the physiological aspects of sound, but can supply physiology with no information in return. In any case, confusion between the two disciplines is impossible. The essence of a language, as we shall see, has nothing to do with the phonic nature of the linguistic sign." [21]

"To require that one should restrict oneself to a linguistic terminology corresponding to linguistic realities is to presuppose that we have already solved the mysteries surrounding these realities. But this is far from being the case." [19]

Course in General Linguistics (1916)
Ferdinand de Saussure

Monday, January 19, 2009

Shamanism in Modern Britain

"'Trance' is achieved when the shaman is conscious of, talking to and operating in all the relevant worlds of his reality at the same time. The shaman can get there by more techniques than can be readily named. Generally, these can be grouped into six main categories: music, song, dance, pain, traditional hallucinogenics and stillness." [367]


Dancing on the Edge: Shamanism in Modern Britain
Gordon Maclellan

The Reality of Spirits

"Then I knew the Africans were right. There is spirit stuff, there is spirit affliction: it isn't a matter of metaphor and symbol, or even psychology. And I began to see how anthropologists have perpetuated an endless series of put-downs about the many spirit events in which they participated — 'participated' in a kindly pretense. They might have obtained valuable material, but they have been operating with the wrong paradigm, that of the positivists' denial." [146]


The Reality of Spirits
Edith Turner

Ojibway Shamanism

"The final stage, namely, the diagnosis of the underlying cause appears to be peripheral to the healing ceremony itself ... This stage recalls the initial stage of invocation ..." [95 - 96]


Ojibway Shamanism
John A. Grim

Wednesday, January 14, 2009

Intonation

"While the links between intonation and punctuation apply, of course, only to literate societies, the links between intonation and gesture are of an altogether more primitive sort. That intonation is a unique part of language is clearly demonstrated from experiments in dichotic listening. In this sort of experimentation similar auditory material is fed to the two ears and the listener shows a preference for the material presented to one ear. For language generally, for tone in tone languages, and even for consonant-vowel nonsense syllables, an advantage is shown for the right ear, which involves the left hemisphere of the brain; whereas a left ear (right hemisphere) advantage is shown for intonation, along with music and general environmental noises. So it is not surprising that in a large majority of cases of acquired language disorders, and even in cases of severe phonological or grammatical disorder, intonation is unaffected. In those few cases in which intonation is affected, patients may well have gestural problems as well. This suggests a close connection between intonation and gesture." [177]


Intonation (1986)
Alan Cruttenden (1936-)

Wednesday, December 17, 2008

The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis

"The analyst's desire is not a pure desire. It is a desire to obtain absolute difference, a desire which intervenes when, confront with the primary signifier, the subject is, for the first time, in a position to subject himself to it." [276]

"You apprehend by the same token the function of the gaze in hypnosis, which may be fulfilled in
fact by a crystal stopper, or anything, so long as it shines. To define hypnosis as the confusion, at one point, of the ideal signifier in which the subject is mapped with the a, is the most assured structural definition that has been advanced." 273]

"Take Socrates. The inflexible purity of Socrates and his atopia are correlative. Intervening, at every moment, there is the demonic voice. Could one maintain that the voice that guides Socrates is not Socrates himself? The relation between Socrates and his voice is no doubt an enigma, which indeed, tempted psychographers on several occasions in the early nineteenth century, and it is already a great merit on their part that they dared to broach the matter since nowadays one daren't touch it with a bargepole." [258]

"To love is, essentially, to wish to be loved." [253]

"Interpretation is not open to any meaning. This would be to concede to those who rise up against the character of uncertainty in analytic interpretation that, in effect, all interpretations are possible, which is patently absurd. The fact that I have said that the effect of interpretation is to isolate in the subject a kernel, a kern, to use Freud's own term, of non-sense, does not mean that interpretation is in itself nonsense." [250]

"But psychoanalysis shows us that what, above all in the initial phase, most limits the confidence of the patient, his abandonment to the analytic rule, is the threat that the psychoanalyst may be deceived by him. How often in our experience does it happen that we discover only very late some important biographical detail? Suppose, for example, that at a particular moment in his life, the subject contracted a venereal disease. But why didn't you tell me earlier one might ask, if one is still naive enough. Because, the analysand may reply, if I had told you earlier, you might have regarded it as responsible, in part at least, perhaps even wholly, for my disorders and I am not here for you to find an organic cause for them." [233]

"What do diplomats do when they address one another? They simply exercise, in relation to one another, that function of being pure representatives and, above all, their own signification must not intervene. When diplomats are addressing one another, they are supposed to represent something whose signification, while constantly changing, is, beyond their own persons, France, Britain, etc. In the very exchange of views, each must record only what the other transmits in his pure function as signifier, he must not take into account what the other is, qua presence, as a man who is likable to a greater or lesser degree. Interpsychology is an impurity in this exchange." [220]

"Everything emerges from the structure of the signifier. This structure is based on what I first called the function of the cut and which is now articulated, in the development of my discourse, as the topological function of the rim." [206]

"... there is an ultimate field, the field of sexual fulfillment, in which, in the last resort, the innocent does not know the way." [204]

"In the psyche, there is nothing by which the subject may situate himself as a male or female being." [204]

"I must, very quickly, point out to you the difference between making oneself heard and making oneself seen. In the field of the unconscious the ears are the only orifice that cannot be closed. Whereas making oneself seen is indicated by an arrow that really comes back towards the subject, making oneself heard goes towards the other." [195]

"I apologize if, as someone remarked last time, there are some obscurities along the way I take you. I believe that obscurity is characteristic of our field." [187]

"Why are the so-called erogeneous zones recognized only in those points that are differentiated for us by their rim-like structure?" [168]

"This, of course, brings us to genetics. And what emerges from this genetics if not the dominant function, in the determination of certain elements of the living organism, of a combinatory that operates at certain of its stages by the expulsion of remainders?" [151]

"He [the therapist] then seeks for assurances in theories that operate in the direction of an orthopaedic, conformist therapeutics, providing access for the subject to the most mythical conception of happiness. Together with an uncritical manipulation of evolutionism, this is what sets the tone of our era." [135]

"This is essential in noting the paradox that is expressed quite commonly in the fact -- which may even be found in Freud's writings -- that the analyst must await the transference before beginning to give his interpretation. I want to stress this question because it is the dividing line between the correct and incorrect conception of the transference ... To appeal to some healthy part of the subject thought to be there in the real, capable of judging with the analyst what is happening in the transference, is to misunderstand that t is precisely this part that is concerned in the transference, that it is this part that closes the door, or the window, or the shutters, or whatever -- and that the beauty with whom one wishes to speak is there, behind, only too willing to open the shutters again." [130]

"What I mean by obscurantism is, in particular, the function assume psychoanalysis in the propagation of a style that calls itself the American way of life, in so far as it is characterized by the revival of notions long since refuted in the field of psychoanalysis, such as the predominance of the functions of the ego." [127]

"The unconscious is the sum of the effects of speech on a subject, at the level at which the subject constitutes himself out of the effects of the signifier." [126]

"I was thinking that in the Bible, for example, there must be passages in which the eye confers the baraka or blessing. There are a few small places where I hesitated — but no. The eye may be prophylactic, but it cannot be beneficent — it is maleficent. In the Bible and even in the New Testatement, there is no good eye, but there are evil eyes all over the place." [118 - 19]

"How could this showing satisfy something, if there is not some appetite of the eye on the part of the person looking? This appetite of the eye that must be fed produces the hypnotice value of painting. For me, this value is to be sought on a much less elevated plane than might be supposed, namely, in that which is the true function of the organ of the eye, the eye filled with voracity, the evil eye. It is striking, when one thinks of the universality of the function of the evil eye, that there is no trace anywhere of a good eye, of an eye that blesses. What can thi smean, except that the eye carries with it the fatal function of being in itself endowed — if you will allow me to play on several registers at once — with a power to separate." [115]

"If a bird were to paint would it not be by letting fall its feathers, a snake by casting off its scales, a tree by letting fall its leave? What it amounts to is the first act in the laying down of the gaze." [114]

"In our relation to things, in so far as this relation is constituted by the way of vision, and ordered in the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is transmitted, from stage to stage, and is always to some degree eluded in it -- that is what we call the gaze." [73]

"Whatever, in repetition, is varied, modulated, is merely alienation of its meaning. The adult, and even the more advanced child, demands something new in his activities, in his games. But this 'sliding-away' (glissement) conceals what is the true secret of the ludic, namely, the most radical diversity constituted by repetition in itself." [61]

"Father, can't you see I'm burning? This sentence is itself a firebrand -- of itself it brings fire where it falls -- and one cannot see what is burning, for the flames blind us to the fact that the fire bears on the Unterlegt, on the Untertragen, on the real." [59]

"Recollection is not Platonic reminiscence -- it is not the return of a form, an imprint, a eidos of beauty and good, a supreme truth, coming to us from the beyond. It is something that comes to us from the structural necessities, something humble, born at the level of the lowest encounters and of all the talking crowd that precedes us, at the level of the structure of the signifier, of the languages spoken in a stuttering, stumbling way, but which cannot elude constraints whose echoes, model, style can be found, curiously enough, in contemporary mathematics." [47]

"And there is only one method of knowing that one is there, namely, to map the network. And how is a network mapped? One goes back and forth over one's ground, one crosses one's path, one cross-checks it always in the same way ..." [45]

"The ancients recognized all kinds of things in dreams, including, on occasion, messages from the gods -- and why not? The ancients made something of these messages from the gods. And, anyway -- perhaps you will glimpse this in what I shall say later -- who knows, the gods may still speak through dreams. Personally, I don't mind either way. What concerns us is the tissue that envelops these messages, the network in which, on occasion, something is caught." [44 - 45]


The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI:
The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1964)
Jacques Lacan